Introduction:
The Middle East’s War widens! Did Iran’s attack on Egypt’s Mediterranean port of Damietta, prompt the US to return to war with Iran? Did Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) drone attack cause the fire that broke out in Damietta, a LNG hub on July 29, 2026? The drone hit a US-owned floating storage and regasification vessel, Energos Winter, sparking a blaze that spread to a Greek-owned LNG tanker, GasLog Salem at 14:20 GMT. Both the storage vessel and tanker have a combined carrying capacity of 300,000 cubic metres of LNG.
“The entire port could have exploded, along with parts of the city of Damietta,” said one officer, recalling fears that the flames could spread to nearby LNG infrastructure in the Nile Delta city of more than 300,000 residents.[1] A catastrophe was averted when the emergency responders especially fire fighters moved rapidly to control the situation.
In the backdrop of clouds of black smoke rising from the port and tugboats hosing down the ships with water, the fires were extinguished.[2] Energos Winter and GasLog Salem left the port and moved into the open sea. For fear of an explosion that could impact the entire port, the storage vessel and tanker attached before were separated and towed offshore.
The threat facing Egypt today is complex. Although the vessel and the tanker were not Egyptian, the attack affected its reputation as a country safe from war. Egyptian economy has already suffered losses from pressures on the Suez Canal with attacks by Ansarallah on Red Sea shipping. The drone attack on Damietta Port threatens Egypt’s energy security and risks driving up global shipping and insurance costs.
The Context:
The US attack on Iran’s economic and energy infrastructure is inevitable and imminent. Fearing US retaliation, Iran and Ansarallah denied that they mounted the drone attack in the Damietta Port. Similar attacks were conducted by IRGC and it’s militias notably the Houthi movement’s Ansarallah on tankers in the Gulf and Red Sea respectively. Likewise, IRGC and Ansarallah have attacked energy infrastructure in the Gulf and Arab countries. Such attacks disrupt global trade and cause oil prices to soar. If the investigation into the drone strike identifies Iran or its partner Ansarallah as the perpetrator, Egypt will be the 13th country attacked by Iran. To get rid of the U.S. presence in the Middle East, Tehran strikes US assets - military, economic and energy. After condemning the Iranian attacks Egypt, an US ally, deployed air-defense systems and military personnel.
Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed its condemnation and denunciation of the drone attack that caused a fire on board two ships in Damietta Port in northern Egypt. The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed in a statement today Saudi Arabia’s full solidarity with Egypt and its support for all measures taken by Egypt to preserve its sovereignty and protect its security and interests.
Oil prices shot up on July 29, 2026, one of the sharpest spikes of the five-month war. Brent crude futures rose more than 8 per cent to push the benchmark well above US$90 a barrel.
Background:
The tit-for-tat fighting between Iran and its partners versus US and its allies in the Middle East has been escalating. Yemen’s Ansarallah declared a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia on July 20, 2026. The Ansarallah started to target Saudi commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In their statement, the Houthis said the declaration of the maritime embargo was “based on the equation of ‘an eye for an eye’ and affirmed “the right of our great people to respond to the blockade with a blockade” and to “all escalation with escalation”.[3]
After Ukraine’s forces struck a Russian warship and vessels used for transporting Iran-linked military cargo in the Caspian Sea on July 25, 2026, Iran threatened to strike targets connected to oil and gas shipments to Europe. Iranian cargo ship Anna was hit and a sailor was killed promoting Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stating that the attack “cannot go unanswered.”[4] The accompanying text described the port’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility as having an annual capacity of 5.2 million tons and serving as a gateway for gas exports to Europe.
After Iran attacked US bases in Jordan, the US and Saudi Arabia carried out joint air strikes on IRGC militias in Iraq that had attacked Saudi oil facilities with drones. When the US and Saudi Arabia responded some 20 Shia members were killed and 32 injured in Iraq.
Iran retaliated by placing Damietta on a map of potential targets broadcast by Iranian state television, under the headline “What could be the targets of Iran’s revenge against Ukraine?”[5]
U.S. and Saudi forces jointly struck positions held by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. Also on July 28th, Iran attempted to strike U.S. bases in Jordan in a surprise attack, but all attacks could be intercepted. In response, U.S. forces resumed strikes against IRGC positions in Iran on July 29th.
The Future
Iran’s strategy is to raise global oil prices and exacerbate LNG shortages to pressure President Trump ahead of the US midterm elections. In response to the drone attack in Damietta, energy and gas facilities around the globe will need to raise their security alert level. The regional ports and energy facilities globally will need to upgrade security protocols against uncrewed drone threats.
To pave way for diplomacy, the U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced on August 1, 2026 that he has agreed to cancel a planned attack on Iran. However, the US with its allies and friends are preparing to strike Iran’s energy infrastructure
The U.S. and the regional power in the Middle East, Israel, are preparing what could be one of the harshest strike waves yet against Iran’s energy infrastructure. The preparations to strike over the weekend (August 1-2) was postponed to give an opportunity for diplomacy. The targets under discussion include power plants and refineries, with high-level talks also held about cutting electricity across Tehran. A number of Iran’s neighbours that were attacked by the Iranian regime is coordinating with Washington. President Trump has not yet given the final execution order, but the military preparation is already in place. Trump said, “I have agreed, for the future benefit of the WORLD and, likewise, the survival of a successful and prosperous Iran, to cancel the attack, subject to being able to rapidly make a Deal. The Country of Israel joins me in this commitment.”
When the US President Donald Trump was asked whether Iran was behind the Damietta attack he said that “it’s a little more of the same.” Stating that the US would respond to Iran “very strongly,” he added, “We’ll hit them very hard because it’s our turn to hit them. And they know it’s coming.”
From February 28 until July 23, 2026, Iran attacked vessels. In response to Iran not attacking any vessels, the U.S. suspended its strikes after 13 consecutive nights of attacks. Iran likewise temporarily suspended its attacks on U.S. bases.
List of attacks against merchant ships in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman:
SKYLIGHT (IMO 9330020): Chemical tanker (Palau). Hit on Feb 28th north of Khasab (OMN). 4 crew members injured; evacuation completed; vessel sank.
MKD VYOM (IMO 9284386): Crude oil tanker (Marshall Islands). Hit on March 1st in the Gulf of Oman. Vessel is drifting and severely disabled; 1 confirmed fatality, unit evacuated. Heavy hull damage above the waterline and fire in the engine room.
HERCULES STAR (IMO 9916135): Product tanker (Gibraltar). Hit on March 1st, 20 nautical miles northwest of Dubai. Fire extinguished.
OCEAN ELECTRA (IMO 9402782): Product tanker (Liberia). Hit on March 1st by a drone or missile, no major damage.
STENA IMPERATIVE (IMO 9666077): Oil/chemical tanker (USA). Hit on March 2nd in the port of Muharraq (Bahrain). Fire extinguished; crew evacuated.
GOLD OAK (IMO 9806342): Bulk carrier (Panama). Lateral hit on March 3rd while at anchor in Fujairah (UAE).
PELAGIA (IMO 9433626): Bulk carrier (Malta). Loud explosion and smoke observed near the vessel on March 3rd.
LIBRA TRADER (IMO 9562673): Tanker (India). Hit on March 3rd by an unknown projectile on March 3, minor damage.
SAFEEN PRESTIGE (IMO 9593517): Container ship (Malta). Hit on March 4th; projectile passed through the vessel; fire broke out. Crew abandoned ship. Further attack on March 18th, fire broke out; no crew on board (since March 4th).
SONANGOL NAMIBE (IMO 9325049): Crude oil tanker (Bahamas). Hit on March 4th at anchor in Iraqi waters; water ingress and ballast water leakage.
MUSSAFAH 2 (IMO 9522051): Tug (UAE). Hit on March 6th while in route to salvage the SAFEEN PRESTIGE; struck by two missiles. 4 dead, 3 injured.
ARABIA III (IMO 8771332): Drilling rig (Liberia). Hit on March 7th; fire under control, one injured, crew reduced to minimum.
MAYUREE NAREE (IMO 9323649): Bulk carrier (Thailand). Hit on March 11th; fire under control, 3 missing.
ONE MAJESTY (IMO 9424912): Container ship (Japan). Hit on March 11th, damage to the vessel’s stern above the waterline.
STAR GWYNETH (IMO 9301031): Bulk carrier (Marshall Islands). Hit on March 11th; punctures in cargo hold and ballast tank, vessel is listing.
ZEFYROS (IMO 9515917): Oil/chemical tanker (Malta). Hit on March 11th during STS (ship-to-ship transfer) with SAFESA VISHNU; fire, one fatality.
SAFESA VISHNU (IMO 9327009): Crude oil tanker (Marshall Islands). Hit on March 11th during STS with ZEFYROS; fire.
SOURCE BLESSING (IMO 9243198): Container ship (Liberia). Hit on March 12th; fire extinguished (German link).
AL SALMI (IMO 9534793): Tanker (Kuwait): Hit on March 30th, drone impact on the starboard side, resulting in fire.
AQUA 1 (IMO 9573660): Tanker (Panama): Two hits on March 31st, one explosion and one unexploded charge in the engine room; recovery of the explosive charge is underway.
QINGDAO STAR (IMO 9318163): Container ship (Marshall Islands): Hit by an unknown projectile on April 7th; damage sustained above the waterline.
GOLD AUTUMN (IMO 9220483): Bulk carrier (Panama): Struck on April 7th, by up to two missiles/drones 200 nm south of Pakistan. A fire broke out and the crew was rescued by Pakistan.
SANMAR HERALD (IMO 9330563): Tanker (India): Attacked on April 18th, by IRGC boats; small arms fire, damage to bridge windows.
CMA CGM EVERGLADE (IMO 9894985): Container ship (France): Hit by a drone on April 18th; damage to containers.
MEIN SCHIFF 4 (IMO 9678408): Cruise ship (Malta), German connection: Observation of an impact in the water 150 m away; hailing via VHF.
EPAMINONDAS (IMO 9153862): Container ship (Liberia): Fired upon on April 22nd, with RPGs and small arms; bridge heavily damaged.
MSC FRANCESCA (IMO 9401116): Container ship (Panama): Fired upon on April 22nd; damage to hull and accommodation; vessel was also ordered to anchor by the IRGC via VHF, seized by Iran.
EUPHORIA (IMO 9235828): Container ship (Panama): Fired upon on April 22nd, by the IRGC; crew retreated to the citadel, was able to escape IRN seizure.
BARAKAH (IMO 9902615): Tanker (Liberia): Hit on May 3rd, by an unknown projectile, likely drones, in the engine room and cargo hold; the crew has abandoned the ship.
MINOAN FALCON (IMO 9605841): Bulk carrier (Liberia): Fired upon on May 3rd, by several small boats; damage to the bridge and superstructure.
JV INNOVATION (IMO 9276688): Tanker (Marshall Islands): Hit on May 4th, by an unknown projectile; reported by third parties; heavy damage to the hull.
CMA CGM SAN ANTONIO (IMO 9294173): Container ship (Malta): Hit on May 5th, by an unknown projectile; several injuries, some serious; the injured were evacuated to shore (German connection).
SAFESEA NEHA (IMO 9563392): Bulk carrier (Marshall Islands). Hit on May 10th, by a drone, fire was extinguished, light damage in the area of the quarterdeck.
MSC SARISKA V (IMO 8715857): Container ship (Panama). Struck on June 1st on the starboard side. Damage at the waterline; fire could be extinguished.
BOCHEM MARENGO (IMO 9749025): Oil and chemical tanker (Hong Kong). According to US NCAGS as of June 14th, it was hit by a cruise missile, with damage to the ballast tank and cargo hold.
EVER LOVELY (IMO 9629110): Container ship (Singapore). Hit on June 25th by a projectile causing minor damage on the bridge
KIKU (IMO 9329796): Crude oil tanker (Panama). Hit on June 27th by a projectile, no major damage
AL REKAYYAT (IMO 9397339): LNG-Tanker (Marshall Islands). Hit on July 7th , fire in engine room was extinguished, crew abandoned ship which was towed.
WEDYAN (IMO 9524970): Crude oil tanker (Saudi Arabia). Hit on July 7th with minor structural damages
CYPRUS PROSPERITY (IMO 9595216): Crude oil tanker (Liberia). Hit on July 7th with minor structural damages
GFS GALAXY (IMO 9401271): Container vessel (Cyprus). Hit on July 11th, resulting in a fire. The crew abandoned the vessel; one person is missing. The vessel was towed to Khor Fakkan.
STOLT MAGNESIUM (IMO 9739317): Tanker (Liberia). Hit on July 13th, resulting in a fire and the complete evacuation of the crew. All crew members were rescued.
MOMBASA B (IMO 9739501): Tanker (Liberia). Hit on July 13th, resulting in a fire. The fire was extinguished using onboard firefighting equipment. One person was killed and several others were injured.
AL BAHYAH (IMO 9937799): Tanker (Liberia). Hit on July 13th, resulting in a fire. The fire was extinguished using onboard firefighting equipment. Eight people were injured, including four with serious injuries.
Conclusion:
The Iranian regime is unwilling to compromise on its military nuclear program, missile program, and militia and terrorist program. Iran presents a long-term threat to global stability and regional security. However, US attacking Iran’s energy infrastructure triggers catastrophic regional escalation, devastating global oil and gas markets, and severe humanitarian crises. The consequences include widespread regional retaliatory strikes, massive economic shocks, and civilian collapse inside Iran.
The IRGC has threatened to retaliate by striking energy fields and facilities across the Middle East, specifically naming Saudi Arabia (Ghawar, Abqaiq, Khurais), the UAE (Zakum, Ruwais), Qatar (Ras Laffan), and Israeli gas fields. Knocking out power and energy grids disables coastal water desalination plants, threatening drinking water supplies for millions of civilians across Gulf nations and Iran. Disruption of major production and LNG nodes, such as Qatar’s Ras Laffan or Iran’s Kharg Island, shocks global energy supplies and risks a worldwide economic recession. Past reciprocal facility strikes in the ongoing conflict have damaged billions of dollars in regional energy assets, pushing markets to high volatility.
Collapsing Iran’s power grid shuts down water pumps, hospitals, sanitation, and food distribution networks, risking mass displacement and disease. Bombing refineries and fuel storage causes massive fires, toxic chemical releases into civilian areas, and severe oil spills in the Persian Gulf.
Will the US striking Iran’s energy infrastructure strengthen the brutal regime that killed, maimed, injured and executed thousands of protesters? Will it defeat the very purpose of regime change or regime reorientation?
The cascading effects of the U.S. attacking Iran’s energy infrastructure will be regional and global.
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Rohan Gunaratna is a professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University. He is a trainer for law enforcement, national security and military counter terrorism units; and is the author and editor of over 30 books.
[1] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/egypt-captains-recount-scramble-stop-disaster-after-drone-strike
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro
[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/20/yemens-houthis-declare-naval-blockade-of-saudi-arabia-what-to-know
A strong assessment of the escalation dynamics, particularly the vulnerability of energy infrastructure and the danger of cascading effects across the Gulf.
One distinction, however, is critical in threat assessment: capability, intent, and precedent are not the same as attribution.
From years of dealing with terrorism and complex threat environments, I learned to treat this distinction very carefully. An actor may possess the means, have an obvious motive, and even have conducted similar operations before — yet that still does not establish responsibility for a specific attack.
This matters because attribution itself can become part of the escalation mechanism. If an uncertain incident is converted too quickly into a confirmed perpetrator, the response may begin driving the intelligence rather than the intelligence driving the response.
The larger danger in the Middle East may therefore not be only deliberate escalation. It is also escalation produced by compressed decision time, ambiguous attacks, proxy relationships, and attribution made under political and military pressure.
That is where a regional crisis can begin acquiring a logic of its own.